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Typical protocols for password-based authentication assume a single server that stores all
the information (e.g., the password) necessary to authenticate a user. An inherent limitation
of this approach, assuming low-entropy passwords are used, is that the user’s password is
exposed if this server is ever compromised. To address this issue, it has been suggested
to share a user’s password information among multiple servers, and to have these servers
cooperate (possibly in a threshold manner) when the user wants to authenticate. We show
here a two-server version of the password-only key-exchange protocol of Katz, Ostrovsky,
and Yung (the KOY protocol). Our work gives the ﬁrst secure two-server protocol for the
password-only setting (in which the user need remember only a password, and not the
servers’ public keys), and is the ﬁrst two-server protocol (in any setting) with a proof of
security in the standard model. Our work thus ﬁlls a gap left by the work of MacKenzie
et al. (2006) [31] and Di Raimondo and Gennaro (2006) [16]. As an additional beneﬁt of
our work, we show modiﬁcations that improve the eﬃciency of the original KOY protocol.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Humans typically choose “weak”, low-entropy passwords, while standard authentication protocols assume the use of
cryptographic (i.e., high-entropy) secrets. Unfortunately, protocols designed and proven secure in the latter setting are gen-
erally insecure in the former context because these protocols are not resistant to off-line dictionary attacks in which an
eavesdropping adversary derives information about the password from observed transcripts of login sessions. In recent
years, much attention has focused on designing password-based authenticated key-exchange protocols resistant to such at-
tacks. (We remark that on-line dictionary attacks – in which an adversary simply attempts to login repeatedly, trying each
possible password – cannot be prevented by cryptographic means but can be dealt with using other methods outside the
scope of this work.)
Means of protecting against off-line dictionary attacks in a single-server setting were ﬁrst suggested [27,21] in a “hybrid”,
PKI-based model where users are required to store the server’s public key in addition to a password. Bellovin and Merritt [5]
were the ﬁrst to suggest protocols for password-only authenticated key exchange (PAKE), where users are required to store only
a short password. These initial works (and others [6,23,28,33]) were relatively informal and did not provide deﬁnitions or
proofs of security. Subsequently, formal deﬁnitions and provably secure protocols for the “hybrid” model were given [22,7],
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oracle/ideal cipher models3 [1,8,30] or in the standard model [26,20,19,25]. (The protocols of [26,19,25] assume some public
information which is available to all parties. Since this information can be hard-coded into implementations of the protocol,
clients do not need to memorize or store any high-entropy, cryptographic information as they are required to do in the
PKI-based setting.)
Although the above protocols protect against off-line dictionary attacks, they do nothing to mitigate the concern that
an adversary might obtain users’ passwords via server compromise. Such attacks represent a serious threat since they are
potentially cost-effective (in that an adversary might be able to obtain thousands of users’ passwords by corrupting a single,
poorly-protected server), and because users frequently utilize the same password at multiple sites. It is easy to show that it
is impossible to protect against server compromise when a single server holds the information needed to authenticate a user
(assuming the only secret information held by the user is a low-entropy password). To protect against server compromise,
Ford and Kaliski [18] thus proposed using a threshold protocol in which the authentication functionality is distributed across
n servers who cooperate to authenticate a user, and who obtain independent session keys (shared with the user) following
a successful authentication. Their protocol, which is designed in the PKI-based model, remains secure (and, in particular, an
adversary learns nothing about users’ passwords other than what it learns from its on-line password guesses) as long as
n− 1 or fewer servers are compromised. Jablon [24] gave a protocol with similar functionality in the password-only setting.
Neither of these works, however, include rigorous deﬁnitions or proofs of security.
Subsequent to the work of Ford–Kaliski and Jablon, a number of provably secure protocols for threshold password-based
authentication have been given. We summarize what is known:
• MacKenzie et al. [31] showed a protocol in the “hybrid”, PKI-based setting which requires only t out of n servers to
cooperate in order to authenticate a user, for any values of t , n (of course, security is only obtained as long as t − 1 or
fewer servers are compromised). They prove security for their protocol in the random oracle model.
• Di Raimondo and Gennaro [16] proposed a protocol in the password-only setting with a proof of security in the standard
model. (A second protocol given in their paper, which we will not discuss further, achieves the weaker functionality in
which the user shares the same session key with all the servers.) Their protocol requires fewer than 1/3 of the servers
to be compromised (i.e., they require t < n/3) and thus does not give a solution for the two-server case.4 (In general,
threshold cryptosystems for the two-party case do not follow immediately from threshold solutions that require honest
majority.)
• Brainard et al. [9] developed a two-server protocol, a variant of which has been proven secure in the random oracle
model [32]. These protocols assume the PKI-based setting since they require a “secure channel” between the client and
the server(s) which must presumably be implemented using public-key techniques.
1.1. Our contributions
We show here a two-server protocol for password-only authenticated key exchange, with a proof of security in the
standard model. Ours is the ﬁrst provably secure two-server protocol in the password-only setting, and is the ﬁrst two-
server protocol (in any setting) with a proof of security in the standard model. Our protocol extends and builds upon the
(single-server) password-based key-exchange protocol of Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung [26] (the KOY protocol). As an additional
beneﬁt of our work, we show two modiﬁcations which improve the eﬃciency of the original KOY protocol even in the
single-server case. (One of these modiﬁcations was also used in [11].)
In Section 4 we describe a “basic” two-server protocol which is secure against a passive (i.e., “honest-but-curious”)
adversary who has access to the entire state of one of the servers throughout its execution of the protocol, but cannot cause
this server to deviate from its prescribed behavior. (Even in the this case, however, the adversary is assumed to control
all communication between the client and the servers.) This protocol is interesting in its own right (when the assumption
on adversarial behavior is warranted), and serves as a useful prelude to our second result. In Section 5 we show how to
modify the basic protocol so as to achieve security against an active adversary who may cause a corrupted server to deviate
arbitrarily from the protocol.
The protocols we construct are relatively eﬃcient. Each party in the basic two-server protocol performs (roughly) twice
the amount of work as in the original KOY protocol. For the protocol secure against active adversaries, the work of the
client stays the same but the work of the servers increases by a factor of approximately 6. (More explicit calculations of the
computational cost are given in the appropriate sections.) This does not take into account potential eﬃciency improvements
such as off-line computation or pre-processing.
3 In the random oracle model [2], parties are assumed to have “black-box” access to a random function; the ideal cipher model assumes that parties have
“black-box” access to a random keyed permutation. In practice, a random oracle is instantiated by a cryptographic hash function. It is known [10], however,
that protocols secure in the random oracle model may be insecure for any choice of hash function.
4 The approach in their paper does not extend to the case t  n/3. The authors mention (without details) that “[i]t is possible to improve the fault-
tolerance to t < n/2 . . .”, but even this would not imply a two-server solution.
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We assume the reader is familiar with the model of Bellare et al. [1] (building on [3,4]) for password-based key exchange
in the single-server case. Here, we generalize their model and present formal deﬁnitions for two-server protocols. While the
model presented here is largely equivalent to the model proposed by MacKenzie et al. [31] (with the main difference
being that we do not assume a PKI), we can simplify matters a bit since we focus on the two-server setting exclusively.
For convenience we ﬁrst describe the model for the case of a “passive” adversary corrupting one of the servers, and then
discuss brieﬂy the modiﬁcations needed to handle an “active” adversary. (As discussed below, in both the “passive” and
“active” cases the adversary is free to interfere with all communication between the client and the servers. These cases only
differ in the power of the adversary to control the actions of the corrupted servers: speciﬁcally, a “passive” adversary is
unable to control the actions of corrupted servers, whereas an “active” adversary can.)
We ﬁrst present a general overview of the system. For simplicity, we assume that every client C in the system shares its
password pw with exactly two servers A and B . In this case we say that servers A and B are associated with C . (A single
server may be associated with multiple clients.) In addition to holding password shares, these servers may also be pro-
visioned with arbitrary other information (that need not be stored by C ). Any such information is provisioned by some
incorruptible, central mechanism (a system administrator, say) at the outset of the protocol. This does not represent a re-
striction in practice, since the servers must be provisioned with correct password shares anyway, and so any additional
information can be provided to the servers at that time. Furthermore, the servers have no restriction – as the client does –
on the amount of information they can store. An (honest) execution of a protocol between client C and associated servers
A and B should result in the client holding two (independent) session keys skC,A , skC,B , and servers A and B holding skA,C
and skB,C , respectively, with skC,A = skA,C and skC,B = skB,C .
2.1. Passive adversaries
We assume an adversary who corrupts some servers at the outset of the protocol, such that for any client C at most one
of the servers associated with C is corrupted. (Our deﬁnition does not require the adversary to corrupt one server associated
with each client; thus, our deﬁnition implies security when neither server associated with some client is corrupted.) In the
case of a passive adversary, a corrupted server continues to operate according to the protocol but the adversary may monitor
the corrupted server’s internal state.
There are two types of communication: between clients and servers, and between servers. We give the adversary full
control over the client-server communication; thus, the adversary can eavesdrop on this communication, send messages of
its choice to servers or clients, or tamper with, delay, refuse to deliver, etc. any messages sent between servers and clients.
Server–server communication is assumed to be done over a secure channel (this can be realized via standard use of private-
key cryptography, since the servers can store long-term, shared keys); thus, the adversary is unable to eavesdrop on the
communication between two uncorrupted servers, and communication between any two servers is not under adversarial
control.5
With the above in mind, we proceed to the formal deﬁnitions.
Participants, passwords, and initialization. There is a ﬁxed set of protocol participants (also called principals), each of
which is either a client C ∈ Client or a server S ∈ Server, where Client and Server are disjoint. Each C ∈ Client is assumed
to have a password pwC chosen uniformly and independently from the “dictionary” {1, . . . ,N}.6 As noted earlier, we make
the simplifying assumption that each client shares its password with exactly two servers. If client C shares its password
with the distinct servers A, B , then A (resp., B) holds a password share pwC,A (resp., pwC,B ); the mechanism for generating
these shares depends on the protocol itself. We also allow each server to hold information in addition to these password
shares. The initialization phase during which this information is provisioned is assumed to be carried out by some trusted
authority, but any information stored by a corrupted server is available to the adversary.
In general, additional information can be generated during the initialization phase. For example, in the “hybrid” pass-
word/PKI model [22,7] public/secret key pairs are generated for each server and the secret key is given as input to the
appropriate server, while the public key is provided to the appropriate client(s). For the protocol presented here, we require
only the weaker requirement of a single set of public parameters that is provided to all parties.
Execution of the protocol. In the real world, a protocol determines how principals behave in response to messages from the
network. In the formal model, these messages are provided by the adversary. Each principal is assumed to be able to execute
the protocol multiple times (possibly concurrently) with different partners; this is modeled by allowing each principal to
have an unlimited number of instances [4,1] with which to execute the protocol. We denote instance i of principal U
5 For two uncorrupted servers, this follows by our assumption of a secure channel between them. A corrupted server in the passive setting communicates
as speciﬁed by the protocol, and so we do not allow the adversary to control this communication. A corrupted server in the active setting may send
whatever it likes and so it is unnecessary to allow the adversary to interfere with the communication channel in this case.
6 As in other work, our protocol and proof of security may be adapted easily to handle arbitrary dictionaries and/or non-uniform (but eﬃciently sam-
pleable) distributions on passwords.
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instance Π iU maintains (local) state, updated during the course of the experiment, which includes the following:
• sidiU , pidiU , and skiU are the session id, partner id, and session key(s) for an instance, respectively. The session id keeps
track of the different executions of a particular user U ; we specify below how this is determined. The partner id denotes
the identity of the principal with whom Π iU believes it is interacting. A client’s partner id will be a set of two servers;
a server’s partner id will be a single client (viewed as a set for notational convenience). For C a client, skiC consists
of a pair skiC,A , sk
i
C,B , where these are the keys shared with servers A and B , respectively. A server instance Π
i
S with
partner C has only a single session key skiS,C .
• termiU and acciU are boolean variables indicating whether a given instance has terminated or accepted, respectively.
Termination means that a given instance is done sending and receiving messages; acceptance indicates successful ter-
mination.
As highlighted earlier, the adversary is assumed to have complete control over all communication between the servers
and clients. This is modeled via access to oracles which are essentially as in [1] and are described now:
• Send(C, i, S,msg), where C ∈ Client and S is a server associated with C . This sends message msg to client instance Π iC ,
supposedly from S . This client instance runs according to the protocol speciﬁcation and the message it outputs, if any,
is given to the adversary. If msg is empty then this query represents a “prompt” for C to initiate the protocol.
• Send(S, i,C,msg), where S ∈ Server is associated with client C . This sends message msg to server instance Π iS , sup-
posedly from C . This instance runs according to the protocol speciﬁcation, and the message it outputs is given to the
adversary. If S is corrupted, the adversary also receives the entire internal state of S; if the other server S ′ associated
with C is corrupted, then the adversary is given the entire internal state of S ′ .
• Execute(C, i, A, B, j), where C ∈ Client and A, B are servers associated with C . This executes the full protocol between
instances Π iC and Π
j
A , Π
j
B , and outputs the entire transcript of the client-server communication in this execution. In
addition, if S ∈ {A, B} is corrupted the adversary is given the entire internal state of S .
• Reveal(U ,U ′, i), where U ′ ∈ pidiU . This outputs skiU ,U ′ , a session key held by instance Π iU . This oracle call models usage
of the session key by some higher-level application, or possible leakage of a session key due to, e.g., compromise of
a host computer.
• Test(U ,U ′, i). This does not model any real capability of the adversary, but is needed to deﬁne security. As in the
case of a Reveal query, we assume U ′ ∈ pidiU . If skiU ,U ′ = null, then this oracle outputs ⊥. Otherwise, a random bit b
is generated; if b = 1 the adversary is given skiU ,U ′ , and if b = 0 the adversary is given a random session key. The
adversary is allowed only a single Test query, at any time during its execution.
As usual, Send oracle calls are intended to model active attacks on the protocol (i.e., “on-line attacks”), whereas Execute
calls are intended to model passive eavesdropping (i.e., “off-line attacks”).
Session ids and partnering. We deﬁne a natural notion of partnering based on matching transcripts. For a client instance Π iC
associated with servers A and B , let sidiC,A (resp., sid
i
C,B ) denote the ordered sequence of messages sent to/from the client
and server A (resp., server B). For a server instance Π jB , let sid
j
B be the ordered sequence of messages sent to/from
this instance and the client; note that server–server communication is not included. Then Π iC and Π
j
B are partnered if:
(1) sidiC,B = sid jB = null; and (2) B ∈ pidiC and C ∈ pid jB .
Correctness. We require a key-exchange protocol to satisfy the following: if a client instance Π iC and server instances Π
j
A
and Π jB run an honest execution of the protocol with no interference from the adversary, then acc
i
C = acc jA = acc jB = true,
and skiC,A = sk jA,C , and skiC,B = sk jB,C .
In the case of an active adversary who has corrupted server A, we impose no correctness requirements. However, our
protocol in Section 5 achieves the following: with all but negligible probability, for every pair of partnered instances Π iC
and Π jB with acc
i
C = acc jB = true, it holds that skiC,B = sk jB,C = null.
Freshness. To formally deﬁne the adversary’s success we must ﬁrst deﬁne a notion of freshness for a session key, where
freshness of a key is meant to indicate that the adversary does not trivially know the value of the key. We say a session
key skiU ,U ′ is fresh if: (1) neither U nor U
′ is a corrupted server, (2) the adversary never queried Reveal(U ,U ′, i); and (3) the
adversary never queried Reveal(U ′,U , j), where Π jU ′ and Π
i
U are partnered.
Advantage of the adversary. Informally, the adversary succeeds if it can distinguish a fresh session key from random. (Re-
stricting to a fresh session key is necessary for a meaningful deﬁnition of security.) Formally, we say an adversary A succeeds
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′ with b′ = b (recall that b is the
bit chosen by the Test oracle). We denote this event by Succ. The advantage of adversary A in attacking protocol P is then
given by
AdvA,P (k)
def= 2 · Pr[Succ] − 1,
where the probability is taken over the random coins used by the adversary as well as the random coins used during the
course of the experiment.
An adversary can always succeed by trying all passwords one-by-one in an on-line impersonation attack; a protocol is
secure if this is the best an adversary can do. In our model, on-line attacks correspond to Send queries. Formally, every
instance for which the adversary has made a Send query counts as one on-line attack. We stress that instances with which
the adversary interacts via Execute queries are not counted as on-line attacks. The number of on-line attacks represents
a bound on the number of passwords the adversary could have tested in an on-line fashion.
Deﬁnition 1. Protocol P is a secure two-server protocol for password-only authenticated key-exchange if, for all dictionary sizes N
and for all ppt adversaries A making at most Q (k) on-line attacks and corrupting at most one server associated with each
client, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that AdvA,P (k) Q (k)/N + ε(k).
Explicit mutual authentication. The above deﬁnition captures the requirement of implicit authentication only (and the
protocol we present here achieves only implicit authentication). Using standard techniques, however, it is easy to add explicit
authentication to any protocol achieving implicit authentication.
2.2. Active adversaries
The only difference in the active case is that the adversary may now cause any corrupted servers to deviate in an
arbitrary way from the actions prescribed by the protocol. Thus, if a server is corrupted the adversary controls all messages
sent from this server to any other servers. (The adversary can also control messages sent from this server to any clients;
note, however, that even a passive adversary has this ability since it controls the communication channel between servers
and clients.) Because of this change, we no longer use a Send oracle to model sending messages to a corrupted server,
but we formally introduce a new Send oracle to model communication from a corrupted server to a non-corrupted server.
(We also charge the adversary with an additional on-line attack for using the latter.) As in the passive case, however,
we continue to assume that the adversary cannot eavesdrop on or control communication between two non-corrupted
servers.
3. A review of the KOY protocol
Here, we provide a brief review of the KOY protocol [26] which will be useful toward understanding our two-server
protocol in the following section. We also discuss the modiﬁcations we introduce to the KOY protocol which have the effect
of both simplifying our eventual two-server protocol as well as improving the eﬃciency of the KOY protocol even in the
single-server setting.
The KOY protocol operates in three rounds. At a high level, in round 1 the client generates a Cramer–Shoup encryp-
tion [14] of its password (using a “public key” contained in the public parameters) and sends the resulting ciphertext to
the server; the server acts symmetrically in round 2. We observe that the following modiﬁcations may be made without
affecting security of the protocol:
• The server may use El Gamal encryption [17] in round 2 rather than Cramer–Shoup encryption (this was ﬁrst observed,
in a different context, in [11]). This is somewhat surprising, as the proof of security in [26] explicitly relies on the
chosen-ciphertext security of Cramer–Shoup encryption, while El Gamal encryption is only semantically secure.
• There is no need for the server to compute a fresh encryption of the password (in round 2) in each execution of the protocol; instead,
the server can store an encryption of the password (along with the randomness used to generate this encryption) as
part of its long-term state, and use the same ciphertext every time it executes the protocol.
We refer to the KOY protocol with the above modiﬁcations as the KOY* protocol. (We do not formally prove security of the
KOY* protocol in the single-server case; however, such a proof may be derived from the proofs of the two-server protocols
that we give in this paper.)
In brief (we provide more detail when we discuss the two-server version of this protocol in the following section),
then, the KOY* protocol assumes public parameters containing a description of a group G with speciﬁed prime order q.
Additionally, the parameters include random generators g1, g2, g3,h, c,d ∈ G× (where G× def= G\{1}) and a hash function H .
Components 〈g1, g2,h, c,d, H〉 will be used for Cramer–Shoup encryption by the client in round 1 (as in the original KOY
protocol), while 〈g1, g3〉 will be used for El Gamal encryption by the server in round 2.
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provisioned with both r′ and a ciphertext ComS,C
def= (gr′1 , gr
′
3 g
pwC
1 ), where r
′ ∈ Zq is chosen at random; note that ComS,C is
simply a (random) El Gamal encryption of gpwC1 .
Execution of the protocol proceeds as follows. When a client Client with password pwC wants to initiate an execution
of the protocol, it runs a key-generation algorithm for a one-time signature scheme, yielding VK and SK. It then chooses
a random r ∈ Zq and computes A = gr1, B = gr2, and C = hr · gpwC1 . It then computes α = H(Client|VK|A|B|C) and sets
D = (cdα)r . Note that (A, B,C, D) is a (labeled) Cramer–Shoup encryption of gpwC1 . The client sends
msg1
def= 〈Client,VK, A, B,C, D〉
to the server.
The server re-computes α = H(Client|VK|A|B|C), then chooses random x′, y′, z′,w ′ ∈ Zq , and computes
E = gx′1 g y
′
2 h
z′(cdα)w ′ .
It sends the message
msg2
def= 〈E, F ,G〉
to the client, where (F ,G) = ComS,C . We stress that the same values F , G are used by this server every time.
Upon receiving msg2, the client chooses random x, y ∈ Zq and computes K = gx1g y3 . It also computes a signature σ on
(msg1,msg2, K ) using SK, and sends
msg3
def= 〈K ,σ 〉
to the server. The client concludes by computing its session key as skC = Er F x(G/gpwC1 )y .
The server, upon receiving msg3, veriﬁes the signature and aborts if it is incorrect. Otherwise, is computes the session key
skS = Ax′ B y′ (C/gpwC1 )z
′
Dw
′
Kr
′
. It may be easily veriﬁed that in a correct execution the client and server compute identical
session keys.
4. A protocol secure against passive adversaries
4.1. Description of the protocol
We assume the reader is familiar with the decisional Diﬃe–Hellman (DDH) assumption [15], strong7 one-time signature
schemes, and the Cramer–Shoup encryption scheme [14] with labels. A high-level depiction of the protocol is given in
Figs. 1–3, and a more detailed description, as well as some informal discussion about the protocol, follows.
Initialization. During the initialization phase, public parameters (i.e., a common reference string) are generated and made
available to all parties. For security parameter k, the public parameters for our protocol contain a group G (written multi-
plicatively) having speciﬁed prime order q with |q| = k; we assume the hardness of the DDH problem in G. Additionally,
the parameters include random generators g1, g2, g3,h, c,d ∈ G \ {1} and a hash function H : {0,1}∗ → Zq chosen at random
from a collision-resistant hash family.
As part of the initialization, each server S is provisioned with an El Gamal public-/secret-key pair (pkS , skS ), where
pkS = gskS1 . If A and B are associated with the same client C , then A (resp., B) is given pkB (resp., pkA ). We stress that, in
contrast to the PKI-based model, the client is not assumed or required to know the public keys of any of the servers.
Given a message m ∈ G and a public key (i.e., group element) pk, we let M ← ElGpk(m) denote the act of choosing a
random r ∈ Zq and setting M = (gr1,pkrm). We let M[1] refer to the ﬁrst component of this ciphertext, and let M[2] refer
to the second. Note that if sk is the corresponding secret key (i.e., pk = gsk1 ), then we have m = M[2]M[1]sk .
Passwords and password shares are provisioned in the following way: a password pwC is chosen randomly for each
client C and we assume that this password can be mapped in a one-to-one fashion to Zq . If A and B are the servers
associated with a client C , then password shares pwA,C ,pwB,C ∈ Zq are chosen uniformly at random subject to pwA,C +
pwB,C = pwC mod q, with pwA,C given to server A and pwB,C given to server B . In addition, both A and B are given
ComA,C , Com′A,C , ComB,C , and Com′B,C , where
ComA,C
def= ElGg3
(
g
pwA,C
1
)= (gra1 , gra3 gpwA,C1 ),
Com′A,C
def= ElGpkA
(
g
pwA,C
1
)
,
7 In a strong signature scheme, an adversary cannot even forge a new signature on a previously signed message.
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Client
(VK,SK) ← Gen(1k)
r1, r2 ← Zq
Aa := gr11 , Ba := gr12 , Ca := hr1 · gpwC1
αa := H(Client |VK|Aa|Ba|Ca), Da := (cdαa )r1
Ab := gr21 , Bb := gr22 , Cb := hr2 · gpwC1
αb := H(Client |VK|Ab|Bb|Cb), Db := (cdαb )r2 〈
Client,VK, Aa, Ba,Ca, Da
Ab, Bb,Cb, Db
〉

msgA = 〈Ea,1, Eb,1, Fa,Ga〉
msgB = 〈Eb,2, Ea,2, Fb,Gb〉Ea := Ea,1 · Ea,2, Eb := Eb,1 · Eb,2
F := Fa · Fb, G := Ga · Gb
x1, y1, x2, y2 ← Zq
Ka := gx11 g y13 , Kb := gx21 g y23
σ ← SignSK(msg1|msgA |msgB |Ka|Kb) 〈msgA,msgB , Ka, Kb,σ 〉
skC,A := Er1a F x1 (G/gpwC1 )y1
skC,B := Er2b F x2 (G/gpwC1 )y2
Fig. 1. An execution of the protocol from the client’s point of view.
ComB,C
def= ElGg3
(
g
pwB,C
1
)= (grb1 , grb3 gpwB,C1 ),
Com′B,C
def= ElGpkB
(
g
pwB,C
1
)
.
(Note that the keys for these El Gamal encryptions differ.) Server A (resp., server B) is additionally given the randomness ra
(resp., rb) used to construct ComA,C (resp., ComB,C ).
Protocol execution. At a high level one can view our protocol as two executions of the KOY* protocol, one between the
client and server A (using server B to assist with the authentication), and one between the client and server B (using
server A to assist with the authentication).
When a client with password pwC wants to initiate an execution of the protocol, this client computes Cramer–Shoup
“encryptions” of pwC for each of the two servers. In more detail (cf. Fig. 1), the client begins by running a key-generation
algorithm for a one-time signature scheme, yielding veriﬁcation key VK and signing key SK. The client next chooses random
r1 ∈ Zq and computes Aa = gr11 , Ba = gr12 , and Ca = hr1 · gpwC1 . The client then computes αa = H(Client|VK|Aa|Ba|Ca) and sets
D = (cdαa )r1 . This exact procedure is carried out a second time using an independent random value r2 ∈ Zq . The client sends
msg1
def= 〈Client,VK, Aa, Ba,Ca, Da, Ab, Bb,Cb, Db〉
to each server as the ﬁrst message of the protocol. Note that this corresponds to two independent “encryptions” of pwC
using the label Client|VK.
The servers act symmetrically, so for simplicity we describe the actions of server A (cf. Fig. 2). Upon receiving msg1,
server A sends “shares” of (1) two values of the form gx1g
y
2h
z(cdα)w (for α ∈ {αa,αb}), one for server A and one for
server B , and (2) an El Gamal encryption of pwC . In more detail, server A chooses random xa, ya, za,wa ∈ Zq and computes
Ea,1 = gxa1 g ya2 hza (cdαa )wa . It also chooses random x′a, y′a, z′a,w ′a ∈ Zq and computes Eb,1 = gx
′
a
1 g
y′a
2 h
z′a (cdαb )w
′
a . Finally, it sets
(Fa,Ga) equal to ComA,C (which, recall, is an El Gamal encryption of g
pwA,C
1 using “public key” g3 and randomness ra). It
sends the message msgA
def= 〈Ea,1, Eb,1, Fa,Ga〉 to the client.
After receiving a second-round message from each server, the client combines the values thus received by multi-
plying them component-wise to obtain 〈Ea, Eb, F ,G〉 (cf. Fig. 1). Note that (1) neither server knows the representation
of Ea (resp., Eb) with respect to the basis g1, g2,h, (cd
αa ) (resp., g1, g2,h, (cd
αb )), and (2) the values (F ,G) form an
El Gamal encryption of the client’s password pwC (with respect to public key g3). The client next chooses random val-
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Client
msg1 =
〈
Client,VK, Aa, Ba,Ca, Da
Ab, Bb,Cb, Db
〉
 msg1 msg1
Server A Server B
Compute αa,αb as in Fig. 1
xa, ya, za,wa
x′a, y′a, z′a,w ′a
←− Zq
Ea,1 := gxa1 g ya2 hza (cdαa )wa
Eb,1 := gx
′
a
1 g
y′a
2 h
z′a (cdαb )w
′
a
(Fa,Ga) := ComA,C
〈Ea,1, Eb,1, Fa,Ga〉
Compute αa,αb as in Fig. 1
xb, yb, zb,wb
x′b, y
′
b, z
′
b,w
′
b
←− Zq
Eb,2 := gxb1 g yb2 hzb (cdαb )wb
Ea,2 := gx
′
b
1 g
y′b
2 h
z′b (cdαa )w
′
b
(Fb,Gb) := ComB,C
 〈Eb,2, Ea,2, Fb,Gb〉
〈msgA,msgB , Ka, Kb,σ 〉 〈msgA,msgB , Ka, Kb,σ 〉
if (Fb,Gb) incorrect, or
signature veriﬁcation fails, output ⊥
else: perform Compute to obtain Xa
skA,C := Axaa B yaa C zaa Dwaa K raa Xa
if (Fa,Ga) incorrect, or
signature veriﬁcation fails, output ⊥
else: perform Compute to obtain Xb
skB,C := Axbb B ybb C zbb Dwbb K rbb Xb
Fig. 2. Execution of the protocol from the servers’ points of view; see text for details. The Compute protocol is given in Fig. 3.
ues x1, y1, x2, y2 ∈ Zq , computes Ka = gx11 g y13 and Kb = gx21 g y23 , and computes a signature σ on msg1|msgA |msgB |Ka|Kb
using the secret key SK that it had previously generated. It sends msg3
def= 〈msgA,msgB , Ka, Kb, σ 〉 to each server as the
ﬁnal message of the protocol. (Of course, msgA need not be sent to A and similarly for msgB . Furthermore, it would suﬃce
for the client to sign and send hashes of these messages.) Finally, the client computes session keys
skC,A := Er1a F x1
(
G/g
pwC
1
)y1
,
skC,B := Er2b F x2
(
G/g
pwC
1
)y2
.
Upon receiving 〈msgA,msgB , Ka, Kb, σ 〉 from the client, server A veriﬁes that the (Fb,Gb) component of msgB is equal
to ComB,C (recall that A stores ComB,C ), and that σ is a valid signature on msg1|msgA |msgB |Ka|Kb with respect to VK.
If veriﬁcation fails, the server terminates the execution. Otherwise, servers A and B jointly execute the Compute protocol
(cf. Fig. 3 and described next) in order to compute their session keys.
Before describing the Compute protocol, we introduce notation for manipulation of El Gamal ciphertexts. If M , M ′ are
two El Gamal ciphertexts (encrypted with respect to the same public key pk), then we let M × M ′ denote (M[1] · M ′[1],
M[2] · M ′[2]). Note that if M is an encryption of m and M ′ is an encryption of m′ , then M × M ′ is an encryption of m ·m′ .
For x ∈ Zq , we let Mx denote the ciphertext (M[1]x,M[2]x). Here, the resulting ciphertext is an encryption of mx .
With this in mind, we now describe the Compute protocol. Since the protocol is symmetric, we simply describe it from
the point of view of server A. This server sets M1 to be an El Gamal encryption (with respect to pkA ) of g
−za
1 . It then
sends M1 to server B , who computes
M ′2 ← MpwB,C1 ×
(
Com′A,C
)−z′b × ElGpkA (g−z
′
bpwB,C
1 A
x′b
a B
y′b
a C
z′b
a D
w ′b
a K
rb
a
)
and sends this value back to server A (recall that rb is the randomness used to construct ComB,C ). Finally, server A de-
crypts M ′2 and multiplies the result by g
−za·pwA,C
1 to obtain Xa . Note that
Xa = g−(za+z
′
b)·pwC · (Ax′ba B y′ba C z′ba Dw ′ba K rba ), (1)1
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M1 ← ElGpkA (g−za1 ) M ′1 ← ElGpkB (g−zb1 )M1,msg1,msg3 
M ′1,msg1,msg3
Verify msg1,msg3
W := Ax′ab B
y′a
b C
z′a
b D
w ′a
b K
ra
b
M2 ← (M ′1)pwA,C × (Com′B,C )−z
′
a
× ElGpkB (g
−z′apwA,C
1 · W )
Verify msg1,msg3
W ′ := Ax
′
b
a B
y′b
a C
z′b
a D
w ′b
a K
rb
a
M ′2 ← (M1)pwB,C × (Com′A,C )−z
′
b
× ElGpkA (g
−z′bpwB,C
1 · W ′)M ′2
M2 
Xa := g−za ·pwA,C1 ·
M ′2[2]
(M ′2[1])skA Xb := g
−zb ·pwB,C
1 ·
M2[2]
(M2[1])skB
Fig. 3. The Compute protocol. See text for a description of the notation used.
using the fact that pwC = pwA,C + pwB,C mod q. In addition to the above, in the ﬁrst step of the protocol the servers
exchange the messages received from the client thus far; each server then veriﬁes that these messages match their own
view (and terminates if not).
Although omitted in the above description, we assume that the client and servers always verify that incoming messages
are well formed, and in particular that all appropriate components of the various messages indeed lie in G (we assume that
membership in G can be eﬃciently veriﬁed).
Correctness. Since the protocol is symmetric, we focus on the session key shared between the client and server A. The
client computes
skC,A = Er1a F x1
(
G/g
pwC
1
)y1
= (gxa+x′b1 g ya+y
′
b
2 h
za+z′b(cdαa)wa+w ′b)r1 g(ra+rb)·x11 g(ra+rb)·y13 .
Meanwhile, server A computes
skA,C = Axaa B yaa C zaa Dwaa K raa Xa
= Axa+x
′
b
a B
ya+y′b
a C
za+z′b
a D
wa+w ′b
a K
ra+rb
a · g−(za+z
′
b)·pwC
1
= Axa+x
′
b
a B
ya+y′b
a
(
Ca · g−pwC1
)za+z′b Dwa+w ′ba K ra+rba ,
using Eq. (1) to substitute for the value of Xa . Continuing, we have
skA,C =
(
g
xa+x′b
1 g
ya+y′b
2 h
za+z′b(cdαa)wa+w ′b)r1(gx11 g y13 )ra+rb ,
which is equal to skC,A .
Eﬃciency. We count exponentiations only, and assume a multi-exponentiation with up to 5 bases can be computed at the
cost of at most 1.5 exponentiations. The client performs the equivalent of 15 full exponentiations (note that pwC is small,
so does not count as a full exponentiation), while each server performs 13 exponentiations (computation of M2, M ′2 can be
done by expressing each of them as the product of two multi-exponentiations). Thus, our protocol increases each party’s
computation relative to the original KOY protocol by about a factor of 2. Performance could be further improved using
pre-computation.
4.2. Proof of security for passive adversaries
Theorem 1. Assuming (1) the DDH problem is hard for G; (2) (Gen,Sign,Vrfy) is a strong one-time signature scheme; and (3) H is
collision-resistant, the protocol of Figs. 1–3 is a secure two-server protocol for password-only authenticated key exchange in the pres-
ence of a passive adversary.
Before proving this theorem, we introduce some notation. We view the adversary’s queries to its Send oracles as queries
to four different oracles Send0, Send1, Send2, Send3 corresponding, respectively, to the request for a client to initiate the
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client C to initiate the protocol; the output of this query is an initial message 〈Client,VK, Aa, . . . , Da, Ab, . . . , Db〉. Simi-
larly, a query Send3(A, i,C, 〈msgA,msgB , Ka, Kb, σ 〉) represents sending message 〈msgA,msgB , Ka, Kb, σ 〉 to instance Π iA
of server A. In the proof, we always let msg1 denote the initial message sent by the client to both servers; let msgA
(resp., msgB ) denote the second-round message sent from server A (resp., server B) to the client; and let msg3 denote the
ﬁnal message sent by the client.
We do not explicitly use collision-resistance of H in the proof that follows, but that assumption is needed for security of
the Cramer–Shoup encryption scheme (which is used in the proof).
Proof of Theorem 1. Given a passive adversary A attacking the protocol, we imagine a simulator that runs the protocol
for A. More precisely, after the adversary chooses which servers to corrupt, the simulator initializes the system (including
selecting the public parameters, choosing passwords for all clients, and computing password shares – as well as any other
necessary information – for all servers), gives A the information held by all corrupted servers, and then responds to the
oracle calls made by A. After computing the appropriate answer to the oracle query, the simulator provides the adversary
with the internal state of any corrupted servers involved in the query.
When the adversary queries the Test oracle, the simulator chooses a random bit b. When the adversary completes its
execution and outputs a bit b′ , the simulator can tell whether the adversary succeeds by checking whether (1) a single
Test query was made regarding some fresh session key skiU ,U ′ , and (2) b
′ = b. Success of the adversary is denoted by
event Succ, and for any experiment P we deﬁne AdvA,P (k)
def= 2 · PrA,P [Succ] − 1, where PrA,P [·] denotes the probability
of an event when the simulator interacts with the adversary in accordance with experiment P . We refer to the original
execution of the experiment (i.e., exactly according to the speciﬁcation of the protocol) as P0. We will introduce a sequence
of transformations to the original experiment and bound the effect of each transformation on the adversary’s advantage.
We then bound the adversary’s advantage in the ﬁnal experiment; this yields a bound on the adversary’s advantage in the
original experiment.
It is useful to keep two observations in mind while reading the proof. First, the initial message of the Compute protocol
(and the fact that we are in the passive setting) ensures that servers A and B abort without outputting a session key
unless they have consistent views on the messages sent between the client and the servers. Second, when the two servers
associated with some client are both uncorrupted the messages exchanged by the servers during the Compute protocol are
irrelevant since the adversary cannot eavesdrop on their communication.
Experiment P ′0. In experiment P ′0, the simulator interacts with the adversary as before except that the adversary does not
succeed, and the experiment is aborted, if any of the following occur:
1. At any point, a msg1 generated by the simulator (whether in response to an Execute query or a Send0 query) is
repeated.
2. At any point, a msgA or msgB generated by the simulator (whether in response to an Execute query or a Send1 query)
is repeated.
3. At any point, the adversary forges a new, valid message/signature pair for any veriﬁcation key used in a simulator-
generated msg1 (whether msg1 was generated in response to an Execute query or a Send0 query).
In addition, the simulator changes how it computes the session key for any non-corrupted server B so that it no longer uses
the long-term El Gamal secret key skB . Recall that this secret key is used only to compute Xb within the Compute protocol.
Instead of computing Xb this way, the simulator simply computes Xb directly via
Xb := g−(zb+z
′
a)·pwC
1 ·
(
A
x′a
b B
y′a
b C
z′a
b D
w ′a
b K
ra
b
)
.
We stress that the simulator can do this because we are dealing with a passive adversary (and so the simulator knows the
internal state of all servers, even corrupted ones).
These changes have only a negligible effect on the adversary’s advantage. Events 1 and 2, above, clearly occur with
only negligible probability. Event 3 occurs with negligible probability assuming the security of (Gen,Sign,Vrfy) as a strong
one-time signature scheme. Finally, the change in computing Xb is merely a conceptual one since we assume a passive
adversary (and so the value of Xb is identical in games P0 and P ′0; cf. Eq. (1)). Putting everything together, we have that|AdvA,P0 (k) − AdvA,P ′0 (k)| is negligible.
Experiment P ′′0 . In this experiment, for any non-corrupted server B the pre-provisioned value Com′B,C (for any client C ) is
set to be an El Gamal encryption of a random value (with respect to the public key pkB ). Similarly, when any non-corrupted
server B runs the Compute protocol with a corrupted server, M ′1 is set to be an El Gamal encryption of a random value
(with respect to the public key pkB ). Since, in experiment P
′
0, the simulator does not use the secret key skB of any non-
corrupted server B (recall that computation of Xb no longer uses skB ), it follows from the semantic security of El Gamal
encryption with respect to the public keys of all non-corrupted servers (as well as a straightforward hybrid argument) that
|AdvA,P ′ (k) − AdvA,P ′′ (k)| is negligible.0 0
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server: We say msg1 is oracle generated if it was output by the simulator in response to an oracle query (i.e., either an
Execute query or a Send0 query); we say msg1 is adversary generated otherwise. We also make the convention throughout
the rest of the proof that any Send3 queries made by the adversary contain a valid signature on the appropriate message as
required by the protocol (since otherwise the server will simply reject the message and terminate the appropriate instance,
and the adversary can determine by itself whether the signature is valid or not). Also, we assume that any components of
adversary-generated messages that are supposed to lie in G actually do (as a server will again reject if this is not the case).
Experiment P1. In experiment P1, the simulator changes the way it responds to a msg3 sent to an uncorrupted server,
when msg1 for the corresponding server instance is oracle generated. (By deﬁnition, this is automatically the case for any
Execute query being answered by the simulator.) Let A and B be the servers associated with some client C , and say B is
uncorrupted. Say a msg3 as described above is sent to instance Π
j
B , either as a result of an Execute(C, i, A, B, j) query or a
Send3(B, j,C, ) query, and that the corresponding instance of server A has also been sent msg3. (If no instance of server A
has yet received the ﬁnal message msg3, then Π
j
B will not execute beyond the ﬁrst message of the Compute protocol.) The
simulator searches for the unique i such that sidiC,B = sid jB (we comment below on the existence of such an i). The simulator
then sets sk jB,C := skiC,B . Furthermore, if A is corrupted then M ′2 (in the Compute protocol) is computed as
M ′2 ← ElGpkA
(
skiC,A · A−xaa B−yaa C−zaa D−waa K−raa gza·pwA,C1
)
.
An i as desired must exist, since otherwise the adversary has succeeded in forging a signature with respect to a veriﬁcation
key generated by the simulator and the simulator would then have aborted (cf. experiment P ′0). Furthermore, this i must
be unique or else an oracle-generated msg1 has repeated and the simulator would have aborted.
The changes just described do not have any effect on the view of the adversary. This is clear for the case of sk jB,C , since
in P ′′0 it is always the case that sk
j
B,C = skiC,B when Π jB and Π iC are partnered and B does not terminate the protocol. (Recall
we assume a passive adversary.) Furthermore, in both experiments P1 and P ′′0 , the value M ′2 is a random encryption of the
unique value v such that
sk jA,C
def= v · (g−za·pwA,C1 Axaa B yaa C zaa Dwaa K raa )= skiC,A .
Thus, AdvA,P1 (k) = AdvA,P ′′0 (k).
We next introduce another conceptual change in the experiment by having the simulator choose public parameters h,
c, d in such a way that it knows their representations with respect to g1, g2. That is, when generating the public parameters
the simulator now chooses g1, g2 ← G \ {1} (as before) and then chooses κ ← Z∗q and (χ1,χ2), (ξ1, ξ2) ← {(x, y) ∈ Zq ×Zq |
gx1g
y
2 = 1}. It then sets
h = gκ1 , c = gχ11 gχ22 , d = gξ11 gξ22 .
It is clear that the resulting distribution on the public parameters is unchanged from the previous experiment, and so this
has no effect on the adversary’s view.
Say (Client,VK, A, B,C, D) is a correct encryption if Aχ1+αξ1 Bχ2+αξ2 = D and C/Aκ = gpwClient1 , where
α
def= H(Client|VK|A|B|C);
otherwise, it is an incorrect encryption. We now distinguish three types of adversary-generated
msg1 =
〈
Client,VK, Aa, Ba,Ca, Da
Ab, Bb,Cb, Db
〉
:
• msg1 re-uses an oracle-generated veriﬁcation key if VK is identical to a veriﬁcation key used in an oracle-generated msg1.
• msg1 is valid if it does not re-use an oracle-generated veriﬁcation key, and (Client,VK, Aa, Ba,Ca, Da) or (Client,VK,
Ab, Bb,Cb, Db) is a correct encryption.
• msg1 is invalid if it does not re-use an oracle-generated veriﬁcation key, and neither (Client,VK, Aa, Ba,Ca, Da) nor
(Client,VK, Ab, Bb,Cb, Db) is a correct encryption.
The simulator can always tell whether a given msg1 re-uses an oracle-generated veriﬁcation key, and (due to the way the
public parameters are now generated) can also eﬃciently determine whether a given msg1 is valid or invalid.
Experiment P2. In this experiment, the simulator changes the way it responds to a msg3 sent to an uncorrupted server when
the msg1 for the corresponding server instance is adversary-generated and invalid. Let A and B be the servers associated
with some client C , and say B is uncorrupted. When a msg3 as described above is sent to an instance Π
j
B of server B , and
B does not terminate the protocol, then the session key sk jB,C is chosen uniformly at random from G. Furthermore, M
′
2 (in
the Compute protocol) is computed as an encryption (with respect to public key pkA ) of a uniform element of G.
662 J. Katz et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 78 (2012) 651–669Claim 1. AdvA,P2 (k) = AdvA,P1 (k).
We prove this by showing that the distributions on the adversary’s views in the two experiments are identical. Assume
A is corrupted, as this is the more diﬃcult case. Let us focus ﬁrst on the case of sk jB,C . Say
msg1 =
〈
Client,VK, Aa, Ba,Ca, Da
Ab, Bb,Cb, Db
〉
,
where msg1 is the ﬁrst message sent to the server instance under consideration. Since msg1 is invalid, we know that
(Client,VK, Ab, Bb,Cb, Db) is an incorrect encryption. So, it must be the case that either A
χ1+αbξ1
b B
χ2+αbξ2
b = Db or
Cb/pwClient = Aκb (or possibly both). In either case, (Ab, Bb,Cb/pwClient, Db) is not a DDH tuple with respect to the basis
(g1, g2,h, cd
αb ). Thus, for any μ,ν ∈ G and ﬁxing the randomness used in the rest of experiment P1, the probability over
choice of xb , yb , zb , wb that Eb,2 = μ and sk jB,C = ν is exactly the probability that
logμ = xb + yb · log g2 + zb · logh + wb · log
(
cdαb
)
(2)
and
logν − (ra + rb) · log Kb
= (xb + x′a) · log Ab + (yb + y′a) · log Bb + (zb + z′a) · log(Cb/gpwC1 )+ (wb + w ′a) · log Db, (3)
where all logarithms are with respect to the base g1, and pwC = pwClient . Note that x′a , y′a , z′a , w ′a are independent of xb , yb ,
zb , wb since we assume a passive adversary. As in [26], then, it can be veriﬁed that Eqs. (2) and (3) are linearly independent
and not identically zero, when viewed as equations over Zq in the variables xb , yb , zb , wb .8 Thus, the desired probability is
exactly 1/q2 and hence the value of sk jB,C is uniformly distributed in G independent of the rest of the experiment.
A similar argument holds for the values of M ′2 and Ea,2, viewed as functions of the random variables x′b , y
′
b , z
′
b , w
′
b and
using in this case the fact that (Client,VK, Aa, Ba,Ca, Da) is an incorrect encryption. In particular, Com′A,C is an El Gamal
encryption (with respect to pkA ) of g
pwA,C
1 and hence (in experiment P1) M
′
2 is an El Gamal encryption of the value
g
−za·pwB,C
1 K
rb
a ·
(
A
x′b
a B
y′b
a
(
Ca/g
pwC
1
)z′b Dw ′ba ).
The rest of the argument is exactly as above. This concludes the proof of the claim. 
Experiment P3. Here, the simulator changes the way it responds to a msg3 being sent to an uncorrupted server when msg1
for the corresponding server instance is adversary-generated and valid. In this case, if msg1 was also sent to the other server
associated with the same client, the simulator halts and the adversary succeeds. (In any other case, the adversary’s success
is determined as in the previous experiment. Note also that in this experiment we no longer need to compute Xb on behalf
of a non-corrupted server, since that value is now no longer used.) Clearly, AdvA,P2(k)  AdvA,P3 (k) since there are now
more ways for the adversary to succeed.
Experiment P4. Let us ﬁrst summarize where things stand in experiment P3. In that experiment, for any non-corrupted
server B , the simulator does not use the value rb (i.e., the randomness used to construct ComB,C ) at any point during the
experiment. In particular, for a given instance Π jB with partner C :
• If msg1 sent to this instance is oracle generated, the simulator computes sk jB,C and M ′2 as described in experiment P1.• If msg1 to this instance is adversary-generated and re-uses an oracle-generated veriﬁcation key, the simulator aborts if
the adversary later sends a msg3 to this instance which contains a valid signature.
• If msg1 to this instance is adversary-generated and invalid, the simulator chooses sk jB,C and M ′2 at random, as described
in experiment P2.
• Finally, if msg1 to this instance is adversary-generated and valid, then the simulator halts and the adversary succeeds
as described in experiment P3.
Let A and B be servers associated with some client C , and say B is non-corrupted. In experiment P4, the simulator
changes ComB,C . Whether A is corrupted or not, ComA,C is computed as before (namely, as a random encryption under
public key g3 of a random value pwA,C ). The simulator sets ComB,C to be a random El Gamal encryption of g
N+1−pwA,C
1 with
respect to public key g3. (Note that the pair pwA,C ,N + 1− pwA,C is now a random sharing of the invalid password N + 1.
8 We use here the fact that M ′1 is no longer an encryption of zb (cf. experiment P ′′0 ) and hence the only information the adversary has about xb , yb , zb ,
wb comes from Eb,2 and skB,C .
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El Gamal encryption that |AdvA,P4 −AdvA,P3 | is negligible. We remark that in experiment P4, the simulator never uses pwC
(for any client C ) in simulating the actions of any non-corrupted server B .
Before continuing, we introduce deﬁnitions for the messages received by the client in the second round of the protocol
that are analogous to those given previously for the case of msg1. For a pair (msgA,msgB) received by the client, say the
pair is oracle generated if both msgA and msgB were output by the simulator in response to an oracle query (i.e., either an
Execute query or a Send1 query). The pair is adversary generated otherwise.
We also introduce another conceptual change in the experiment by now having the simulator choose public parameter g3
by ﬁrst selecting random λ ← Z∗q and then setting g3 = gλ1 . It is clear that the resulting distribution on g3 is unchanged.
With this in place, we can now deﬁne notions of validity/invalidity in a way analogous to that done previously for the case
of msg1. Namely, say a client receives messages msgA = 〈Ea,1, Eb,1, Fa,Ga〉 and msgB = 〈Eb,2, Ea,2, Fb,Gb〉, and deﬁne Ea ,
Eb , F , G as in the client’s execution. We say the pair (msgA,msgB) is valid if G/F λ = gpwC1 and invalid otherwise. Since the
simulator knows logg1 g3, it can eﬃciently determine validity. Observe that if both msgA and msgB are oracle generated,
then (msgA,msgB) is invalid because of the way ComA,C and ComB,C was computed in P4.
Experiment P5. In experiment P5, the simulator changes the way it responds to an invalid (msgA,msgB). In that case, the
simulator computes msg3 as in the previous experiment but then chooses keys skC,A and skC,B independently and uniformly
at random from G.
Claim 2. AdvA,P4(k) = AdvA,P5 (k).
The proof of this claim follows that of Claim 1. We prove the claim by showing that the distributions on the adversary’s
views in the two experiments are identical. Let 〈Ea, Eb, F ,G〉 be as computed by some client C after receiving (msgA,msgB).
By deﬁnition of invalidity, we have that G/F λ = gpwC1 , where λ def= logg1 g3. Letting s = logg1 F and s′ = logg1 (G/gpwc1 ), this
means that s′ = λs. For any μ1,μ2, ν1, ν2 ∈ G, the probability over choice of x1, y1, x2, y2 (ﬁxing the randomness used
in the remainder of the experiment) that Ka = μ1, Kb = μ2, skC,A = ν1, and skC,B = ν2 is exactly the probability that the
following linear equations in x1, y1, x2, y2 (over Zq) hold:
logg1 μ1 = x1 + λ · y1,
logg1 μ2 = x2 + λ · y2,
logg1 ν1 − r1 logg1 Ea = x1 · s + y1 · s′,
logg1 ν2 − r2 logg1 Eb = x2 · s + y2 · s′.
These equations are linearly independent (given s′ = λs), and so the desired probability is 1/q4. Hence, as desired, the values
of skC,A and skC,B are uniformly and independently distributed.
Experiment P6. Paralleling the change in experiment P3, the simulator now changes the way it responds to a valid
(adversary-generated) (msgA,msgB): upon receiving such a message the simulator halts and the adversary succeeds. (In
any other case, the adversary succeeds as in P5.) This can only increase the adversary’s probability of success and so
AdvA,P5 (k) AdvA,P6 (k).
Experiment P7. In experiment P6, the simulator does not use the values r1, r2 (in simulating a client instance) other than
to construct the Cramer–Shoup ciphertexts (Aa, . . . , Da) and (Ab, . . . , Db) which are encryptions of the correct password
value gpwC1 . In experiment P7, the simulator instead sets these ciphertexts to be encryptions of 1 (i.e., it sets Ca = hr1 and
Cb = hr2 ). (Note this corresponds to the “password” 0.) The following bounds the effect this can have on the adversary’s
success probability:
Claim 3. Under the DDH assumption, |AdvA,P6 (k) − AdvA,P7 (k)| is negligible.
The claim follows from the security of the Cramer–Shoup encryption scheme (with labels) under adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attack. The proof follows that of [26], and we merely sketch an outline here. Given a public-key (g1, g2,h, c,d)
for an instance of the Cramer–Shoup encryption scheme, as well as access to an encryption oracle and a decryption ora-
cle, the simulator will ﬁrst use the given values as the appropriate portion of the public parameters. The remaining public
parameter, g3, is generated so that the simulator knows logg1 g3; the distribution of g3 is the same as in P6. Every time
the simulator responds to a request to initiate an interaction on behalf of a client C (i.e., as a result of an Execute query
or a Send0 query), it generates a veriﬁcation key VK as before and then submits (twice) to its encryption oracle the query
(〈Client,VK〉, gpwC1 ,1) and receives in return ciphertexts (Aa, Ba,Ca, Da) and (Ab, Bb,Cb, Db). (In the query to the encryp-
tion oracle, 〈Client,VK〉 is the label, and gpwC and 1 are the two messages.) The simulator then uses these ciphertexts to1
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As for the server-side interactions, here the simulator needs to be able to determine whether an adversary-generated msg1
is valid or not. It can do this using its decryption oracle, with the only subtlety being to verify that the simulator never
needs to query the decryption oracle with a (label, ciphertext) pair it received from its encryption oracle. This is not quite
as obvious in our case as in [26] because it is possible in our case for a msg1 to be adversary-generated but for one of the
component ciphertexts of this message to be equal to a component ciphertext of an oracle-generated msg1. Yet it remains
true due to the following observations:
• If msg1 is oracle generated, then no decryption is needed.
• If an adversary-generated msg1 re-uses an oracle-generated veriﬁcation key, the simulator will abort if the adversary
later sends a msg3 with a valid signature (because this implies a signature forgery).
• Otherwise, the veriﬁcation key VK used in msg1 is different from all oracle-generated veriﬁcation keys, and so the
(label, ciphertext) pair submitted by the simulator to its decryption oracle is different from all (label, ciphertext) pairs
received from its encryption oracle.
The proof concludes by noting that when the encryption oracle encrypts its left-most input, the adversary’s view is identical
to its view in experiment P6, while when the encryption oracle encrypts its right-most input, the adversary’s view is
identical to its view in experiment P7. 
The adversary’s view in experiment P7 is independent of the passwords chosen for the various clients except for the
fact that the adversary learns whether adversary-generated msg1 or (msgA,msgB) are valid or not. That is, although the
adversary is given password shares pwA,C for any corrupted server(s) A and any client(s) C associated with A, these shares
are uniformly distributed in Zq and therefore contain no information about the actual client password(s) pwC . Furthermore,
the simulator does not use pwC except to test whether adversary-generated msg1 and (msgA,msgB) are valid or not. Let
GuessPWD denote the event that the adversary sends a valid msg1 or (msgA,msgB). The probability of GuessPWD is at
most Q (k)/N , where Q (k) is the number of on-line attacks made by A. (Although the adversary gets the equivalent of
two password guesses for each msg1, for the adversary to succeed it must send a valid msg1 to both servers associated
with some client. Thus, this requires two on-line attacks.) If GuessPWD does not occur then the adversary can succeed
only by correctly guessing the value of b used by the Test oracle. In this case, however, all fresh session keys are uniformly
distributed in G independent of the adversary’s view, and so the probability that the adversary can correctly guess b in this
case is exactly 1/2.
Putting everything together, we have
PrA,P7 [Succ] = Pr[GuessPWD] +
1
2
· (1− Pr[GuessPWD])
= 1
2
· Pr[GuessPWD] + 1
2
 Q (k)
2N
+ 1
2
,
and thus the adversary’s advantage in experiment P7 is at most Q (k)/N . The sequence of claims proven above show that
AdvA,P0(k) AdvA,P7(k) + ε(k)
for some negligible function ε(·), and therefore the adversary’s advantage in P0 (i.e., the original protocol) is at most Q (k)/N
plus some negligible quantity, as desired. 
5. Handling active adversaries
Here, we describe the necessary changes to the protocol in order to handle active adversaries. We then sketch the
appropriate modiﬁcations to the proof given in the previous section.
5.1. Overview of changes to the protocol
At a high level, the changes we make can be summarized as follows:
Proofs of correctness. We require servers to give proofs of correctness for their actions during the Compute protocol. We stress
that we use only the fact that these are proofs (and not proofs of knowledge) and therefore we do not require any rewinding
in our proof of security. This is crucial, as it enables us to handle concurrent executions of the protocol. Nevertheless, as part
of the proofs of correctness we will have the servers encrypt certain values with respect to (additional) per-server public
keys provisioned during protocol initialization. This will, in fact, enable extraction of certain values from the adversary
during the security proof.
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provisioned with appropriate El Gamal encryptions of the password share of the other server. We will use these encrypted
values (along with the proofs of correctness discussed earlier) to “force” a corrupted server to use the correct password
share in its computations.
Simulating proofs for non-corrupted servers. During the course of the proof of security it will be necessary for non-
corrupted servers to deviate from the prescribed actions of the protocol, yet these servers must give “valid” proofs of
correctness to corrupted servers. We cannot use “standard” zero-knowledge proofs in our setting, since (1) this would re-
quire rewinding which we explicitly want to avoid, and (2) potential malleability issues arise due to the fact that a corrupted
server may be giving its proof of correctness at the same time a non-corrupted server is giving such a proof (this is so even
if we force sequential executions of the proofs of correctness within any particular instance, since multiple instances may be
simultaneously active). To enable simulatability in a concurrent setting we rely on techniques of MacKenzie [29] described
in greater detail below.
5.2. Detailed description of changes to the protocol
We ﬁrst discuss the necessary modiﬁcations to the initialization phase. In addition to the values already discussed in
Section 4.1: (1) each server S is given a random triple tripleS = (US,1,US,2,US,3) of elements chosen uniformly at random
from G. Furthermore, (2) if servers A and B are associated with the same client C , then B is given tripleA and A is given
tripleB .
We next describe the necessary changes to the protocol itself. In what follows, we use witness-indistinguishable
Σ-protocols (with negligible soundness error9) [12] of various predicates and it will be useful to develop some notation. If
Ψ represents a predicate (deﬁned over some public values), we let Σ[Ψ ] denote a Σ-protocol for this predicate. If Ψ1, Ψ2
are two predicates, then we let Σ[Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2] denote a Σ-protocol for the “or” of these predicates. Given Σ-protocols for Ψ1
and Ψ2, there are standard techniques to combine these so as to obtain a Σ-protocol for Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2 [13]. We deﬁne the
predicate DDHS , for any server S with tripleS = (U1,U2,U3), as follows:
DDHS(U1,U2,U3)
def= [∃x, y s.t. U1 = gx1 ∧ U2 = g y1 ∧ U3 = gxy1 ];
i.e., DDHS denotes the predicate asserting that tripleS is a Diﬃe–Hellman triple.
The only change in the protocol is the Compute component, which is modiﬁed in the following ways (we describe the
changes from the point of view of server A, but they are applied symmetrically to server B): In the ﬁrst phase, in addition
to computing M1 ← ElGpkA (g−za1 ), server A computes
vxa,ya,za,wa := Axaa B yaa C zaa Dwaa and Vxa,ya,za,wa ← ElGpkA (vxa,ya,za,wa )
and sends Vxa,ya,za,wa to B . Deﬁne the predicate Ψ1 as follows:
Ψ1
def=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣∃xa, ya, za,wa, r, r˜ s.t.:
Ea,1 = gxa1 g ya2 hza (cdαa )wa
M1 = (gr1,pkrA · g−za1 )
Vxa,ya,za,wa = (gr˜1,pkr˜A · Axaa B yaa C zaa Dwaa )
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
Server A then acts as a prover in the protocol Σ[Ψ1 ∨ DDHA]. Meanwhile, A acts as a veriﬁer in the symmetric Σ-protocol
being given (possibly concurrently) by server B . If B ’s proof fails, then A aborts immediately.
In the second phase of the Compute protocol, in addition to computing M2 as in Fig. 3, server A also computes
vz′a := g
z′a
1 vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a := A
x′a
b B
y′a
b C
z′a
b D
w ′a
b
V z′a ← ElGpkA (vz′a ) Vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a ← ElGpkA (vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a )
and sends Vz′a and Vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a to B . Deﬁne the predicate Ψ2 as being true if there exist values x
′
a , y
′
a , z
′
a , w
′
a , ra , pwA,C , r,
r˜, rˆ such that all the following hold:
1. Eb,1 = gx
′
a
1 g
y′a
2 h
z′a (cdαb )w
′
a ;
2. Vz′a = (gr1,pkrA · g
z′a
1 );
3. Vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a = (gr˜1,pkr˜A · A
x′a
b B
y′a
b C
z′a
b D
w ′a
b );
4. M2 = (M ′1)pwA,C × (Com′B,C )−z
′
a × (grˆ1,pkrˆB · g
−z′a ·pwA,C
1 A
x′a
b B
y′a
b C
z′a
b D
w ′a
b K
ra
b );
5. ComA,C = (gra1 , gra3 g
pwA,C
1 ).
9 From now on, “Σ-protocol” means a witness-indistinguishable Σ-protocol with negligible soundness error.
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being given (possibly concurrently) by server B . If B ’s proof fails, then A aborts without computing a session key.
Relatively eﬃcient Σ-protocols for the above predicates can be constructed using standard techniques (see, e.g., [29]),
and so we omit further details.
Eﬃciency. Compared to the basic protocol, the computational work of the client is unchanged. As for the servers, assuming
we instantiate the protocol using Σ-protocols as in [29] we calculate that each server must perform a total of roughly 70
exponentiations. (I.e., each server’s work is increased by a factor of roughly 6 as compared to the basic protocol.) Once again,
this does not take into account any potential eﬃciency improvements such as off-line computation or pre-computation that
could be done to speed up ﬁxed-base exponentiations. By way of comparison, the protocol of Di Raimondo and Gennaro [16]
requires each server to perform roughly 80 exponentiations for the smallest threshold supported by their scheme (i.e., n = 4,
t = 1).
5.3. Proof of security for active adversaries
We prove that the modiﬁed protocol described above is secure against active adversaries; that is:
Theorem 2.With the modiﬁcations described above and under the same assumptions as in Theorem 1, we obtain a secure two-server
protocol for password-only authenticated key exchange in the presence of an active adversary.
In the proof of the above theorem, we only show the differences from the proof of Theorem 1. In the following, we let
ElG−1sk (M)
def= M[2]
M[1]sk for any sk ∈ Zq and El Gamal ciphertext M .
Proof of Theorem 2. Given an active adversary A attacking the protocol, we imagine a simulator which runs the protocol
for A as in the proof of Theorem 1. AdvA,P (k) is deﬁned as there, and we again refer to the original experiment as P0.
Throughout the proof, we will again assume without loss of generality that for any client C associated with servers A and B ,
the adversary corrupts server A. (The case when neither server is corrupted follows as in the proof for passive adversaries.)
Experiment P ′0. In experiment P ′0, the simulator makes the following changes: First, as in the proof of Theorem 1, the
experiment is aborted and the adversary does not succeed if any of the following occur:
1. At any point, a msg1 generated by the simulator repeats.
2. At any point, a msgA or msgB generated by the simulator repeats.
3. At any point, the adversary forges a new, valid message/signature pair for any veriﬁcation key used in a simulator-
generated msg1.
4. At any point during the experiment, a collision occurs in the hash function H .
In addition, for any non-corrupted server B the simulator sets tripleB to be a (random) Diﬃe–Hellman triple, while for any
corrupted server A the simulator sets tripleA to be a (random) non-Diﬃe–Hellman triple. Finally, the simulator also changes
how it computes the session key for any non-corrupted server B; in particular, it will no longer use the long-term El Gamal
secret key skB to compute Xb . Instead, the simulator computes Xb in the following way: using skA , the simulator decrypts
Vz′a and Vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a to obtain values vz′a and vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a , respectively. It then sets
Xb := g−zb ·pwC1 · (vz′a )−pwC · Krab · vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a
(recall that the simulator knows pwC and ra).
We claim that these changes have only a negligible effect on the adversary’s advantage. It is immediate that the four
events listed above occur with only negligible probability. Moreover, the DDH assumption implies that the adversary cannot
distinguish the change in the way tripleS is computed for the corrupted and non-corrupted servers. It remains only to argue
that the change in computing Xb has negligible effect. Consider an execution of the Compute protocol between a non-
corrupted B and a corrupted A. Because of the Σ-protocols executed by A as part of the protocol, with all but negligible
probability there exist values x′a, y′a, z′a,w ′a such that
ElG−1skB (M2) = g
−zb ·pwA,C
1 · g
−z′a·pwB,C
1 · g
−z′a·pwA,C
1 · Ax
′
a
b B
y′a
b C
z′a
b D
w ′a
b K
ra
a
and
vz′a = g
z′a
1 and vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a = A
x′a
b B
y′a
b C
z′a
b D
w ′a
b ,
for values pwA,C , pwB,C , zb , ra chosen (and known) by the simulator. It follows that, with all but negligible probability, the
values of Xb computed in experiments P0 and P ′0 are identical. Putting everything together, we have that |AdvA,P0 (k) −
AdvA,P ′ (k)| is negligible.0
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using a witness for the predicate DDHB . (This is possible since, in the previous experiment, tripleB was chosen as a DDH
triple for any non-corrupted server B .) It follows immediately from the witness indistinguishability of the Σ-protocols that
|AdvA,P ′0 (k) − AdvA,P ′′0 (k)| is negligible.
Experiment P ′′′0 . Here, all ciphertexts throughout the course of the experiment that are computed by the simulator as
El Gamal encryptions of some value with respect to pkB (for a non-corrupted server B) are now formed by encrypting a
random group element. These ciphertexts include the values Com′B,C (for any client C ) constructed during the initialization
phase, as well as M ′1 (generated during the Compute protocol run with a corrupted server A), and all ciphertexts computed
by server B as part of the Σ-protocols in which B acts as a prover when interacting with a corrupted A.
Since neither skB nor the randomness used to generate any of the ciphertexts of the type considered here are ever used
by the simulator in experiment P ′′0 (relying here on the fact that, in experiment P ′′0 , the simulator uses a witness for DDHB
when acting as a prover), semantic security of El Gamal encryption implies that |AdvA,P ′′0 (k) − AdvA,P ′′′0 (k)| is negligible.
In the experiments that follow, we use the same deﬁnitions as in the proof of Theorem 1 for oracle-generated and
adversary-generated messages msg1.
Experiment P1. In experiment P1, the simulator interacts with the adversary as in P ′′′0 except for the way the simulator
computes certain values in response to a msg3 sent to an uncorrupted server when msg1 for the corresponding server
instance is oracle generated. (By deﬁnition, this is automatically the case for any Execute query being answered by the
simulator.) Let A and B be the servers associated with some client C , and say B is uncorrupted. Say a msg3 as described
above is sent to instance Π jB , and server A runs the Compute protocol with B . The simulator ﬁnds the unique i such that
sidiC,B = sid jB (as in the proof of Theorem 1, a unique such i exists), and sets sk jB,C := skiC,B (assuming instance Π jB does not
abort due to an incorrect proof by server A).
Furthermore, if server A is corrupted then the simulator computes M ′2 in the Compute protocol as follows (again, as-
suming Π jB does not abort due to an incorrect proof by server A): using skA , the simulator decrypts M1 and Vxa,ya,za,wa to
obtain vza
def= g−za1 and vxa,ya,za,wa , respectively. It then sets
M ′2 ← ElGpkA
(
skiC,A · (vxa,ya,za,wa )−1 · K−raa · (vza )−pwA,C
)
.
We claim that these changes have only negligible effect on the adversary’s advantage. In particular, due to the
Σ-protocols (in which A acts as a prover) we know that with all but negligible probability there exist values x′a , y′a , z′a , w ′a
such that the following all hold:
1. Eb,1 = gx
′
a
1 g
y′a
2 h
z′a (cdαb )w
′
a ;
2. vz′a = g
z′a
1 ;
3. vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a = A
x′a
b B
y′a
b C
z′a
b D
w ′a
b .
Furthermore, there exist values xa, ya, za,wa such that the following hold:
1. Ea,1 = gxa1 g ya2 hza (cdαa )wa ;
2. vza = g−za1 ;
3. vxa,ya,za,wa = Axaa B yaa C zaa Dwaa .
Assuming this to be the case, consider the computation of skB,C . In experiment P ′′′0 we have
sk jB,C = Axbb B ybb C zbb Dwbb K rbb · g−zb ·pwC1 · (vz′a )−pwC · Krab · vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a
= Axb+x′ab B
yb+y′a
b
(
Cb/g
pwC
1
)zb+z′a Dwb+w ′ab K ra+rbb .
This is exactly equal to skiC,B (for i as deﬁned above), and hence the values of sk
j
B,C computed in experiments P
′′′
0 and P1
are identical. Considering next the case of M ′2, in experiment P ′′′0 this is a random El Gamal encryption (with respect to
public key pkA ) of
g
−za·pwB,C
1 · g
−z′b ·pwC
1 · A
x′b
a B
y′b
a C
z′b
a D
w ′b
a K
rb
a = skiC,A · (vxa,ya,za,wa )−1 · K−raa · (vza )−pwA,C ,
for i as deﬁned above. Thus, M ′2 is distributed identically in experiments P ′′′0 and P1. Putting everything together,|AdvA,P (k) − AdvA,P ′′′(k)| is negligible.1 0
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it knows their representations with respect to g1, g2. We omit the details here. Once this is done, the simulator can again
distinguish between incorrect and correct encryptions, and can thus distinguish between adversary-generated msg1 which
are valid or invalid; all these terms are deﬁned exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1. We also recall from that proof the
notion of an adversary-generated msg1 which re-uses an oracle-generated veriﬁcation key.
Experiment P2. In this experiment, the simulator changes the way it responds to a msg3 sent to an uncorrupted server when
the msg1 for the corresponding server instance is adversary-generated and invalid. Let A and B be the servers associated
with some client C , and say B is uncorrupted. When msg3 as described above is sent to an instance Π
j
B of server B (and
this instance does not prematurely terminate the protocol) then sk jB,C is chosen uniformly at random from G. Furthermore,
M ′2 (in the Compute protocol) is computed as an encryption (with respect to public key pkA ) of a uniform element of G.
We prove that AdvA,P2 (k) = AdvA,P1 (k) by showing that the distributions on the adversary’s views in the two experi-
ments are identical. Let us focus ﬁrst on the case of sk jB,C . Say
msg1 =
〈
Client,VK, Aa, Ba,Ca, Da
Ab, Bb,Cb, Db
〉
,
where msg1 is the ﬁrst message sent to the server instances under consideration. Since msg1 is invalid, we know that
(Client,VK, Ab, Bb,Cb, Db) is an incorrect encryption. So, it must be the case that either A
χ1+αbξ1
b B
χ2+αbξ2
b = Db or else
Cb/pwClient = Aκb (or possibly both). For any μ,ν ∈ G and ﬁxing the randomness used in the rest of experiment P1, the
probability over choice of xb, yb, zb,wb that Eb,2 = μ and sk jB,C = ν is exactly the probability that
logμ = xb + yb · log g2 + zb · logh + wb · log
(
cdαb
)
(4)
and
logν − (ra + rb) · log Kb − log vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a + pwC · log vz′a
= xb · log Ab + yb · log Bb + zb · log
(
Cb/g
pwC
1
)+ wb · log Db, (5)
where all logarithms are with respect to the base g1 and pwC = pwClient . As in the proof of Theorem 1, it can be veriﬁed
that Eqs. (4) and (5) are linearly independent and not identically zero, when viewed as equations over Zq in the variables
xb, yb, zb,wb . Thus, the desired probability is exactly 1/q2 and hence the value of sk
j
B,C is uniformly distributed in G
independent of the rest of the experiment. (Note that this is true even though vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a may depend on the value of
Eb,2 = μ, since that is the only dependence of vx′a,y′a,z′a,w ′a on xb , yb , zb , wb .)
A similar argument holds for the values of M ′2 and Ea,2, viewed as functions of the random variables x′b , y
′
b , z
′
b , w
′
b and
using in this case the fact that (Client,VK, Aa, Ba,Ca, Da) is an incorrect encryption. In particular, Com′A,C is an El Gamal
encryption (with respect to pkA ) of g
pwA,C
1 and hence the value M
′
2 in experiment P1 is an El Gamal encryption of the value(
ElG−1skA (M1)
)pwB,C · Krba · Ax′ba B y′ba (Ca/gpwC1 )z′b Dw
′
b
a .
The rest of the argument is exactly as above.
The remainder of the proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 1. In fact, the only signiﬁcant difference is
in the counting of the adversary’s on-line attacks. Once again the adversary gets the equivalent of two password guesses
for each msg1 it sends to an uncorrupted server. However, for the adversary to succeed it must either send a valid msg1 to
two uncorrupted servers associated with the same client, or else must sent a valid msg1 to an uncorrupted server and then
initiate the Compute protocol with that same server. Either way, this adversary is charged with two on-line attacks. 
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